Clearly intended for the "popular" market, Waller\'s book leaves a lot to be desired as far as the readership of this journal will be concerned. In spite of the author\'s repeated attempts to point to the unifying themes of his book, it comes across to the reader who knows something about the history of science and medicine, or something about the philosophy and sociology of science as a ragbag of *causes célèbres* of such differing kinds that it presents no sound conclusions about the nature of modern science.

Divided into two parts, the first presents five case studies which reveal "conduct unbecoming of a good scientist" (p. 284), by "distorting experimental results until they are consistent with strongly held beliefs" (p. 110), and could be said, therefore, to be concerned with the nature of science itself. The eight case studies of the second part are said to be concerned with "offences committed against the historical record" (p. 284), by inventing myths to displace historical truths. The naïve reader will no doubt be persuaded. The not so innocent reader will wonder, however, whether it is legitimate to include a notorious case of the dangers of scientism, Frederick Taylor\'s "scientific management", or a clear case of ideologically driven "science", the "Hawthorne Experiment", alongside Robert Millikan\'s attempts to measure the charge on the electron, or Arthur Eddington\'s attempts to confirm general relativity, or Louis Pasteur\'s efforts to disprove spontaneous generation (even granting the ideological dimension to these efforts). The lessons of each case study do not build up to provide a cumulative picture of the dangers or pitfalls of the experimental method, or of the institutional organization of science, they simply remain interesting cases in their own right.

Some readers of this review will already have noted that there is nothing original in Waller\'s choice of case studies either. It is clear from reading his accounts that they are entirely derivative upon earlier studies; often a single study (John Farley and Gerald Geison on the Pasteur-Pouchet debate, Gerald Holton on Millikan, John Earman and Clark Glymour on Eddington). Waller talks throughout of the importance of history for understanding the nature of science, but by repeating familiar case studies he is in danger of showing the poverty of historicism. Instead of repeating old lessons of history, wouldn\'t it be better to reinforce them with new case studies?

The same disparity of historiographical themes can be seen in the second part. Is there a general lesson about science, *qua* science, to be learned from the pathological dishonesty of Charles Best, self-professed discoverer of insulin? Surely there is a world of difference between the simple storybook account of John Snow\'s role in the discovery of cholera germs, or Joseph Lister\'s role in antisepsis, and the much more scientifically significant myth-making around Gregor Mendel and the establishment of so-called Mendelian genetics? What is the link between these cases and the efforts of T H Huxley and others to promote their own professionalizing strategies by deliberately severing age-old links between science and religion? To be sure, these case studies can all be seen to include myth-making at the expense of sound history, but their real interest lies in the unique details of the historical contingencies which shaped them.

For those who do not know these famous cases, Waller\'s book will no doubt seem fascinating and revealing. But the cases are justifiably famous, being full of intrinsic interest, and all Waller has done is to string them together in an accessible way.
